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1. Introduction 
reen grabbing is the privatization or appropri-
ation of land for purposes of advancing a 
“green” economy while excluding local, in-
digenous people from natural resources. The growing 
literature on the subject suggests that this is a problem 
of global scale that has mainly arisen during a histori-
cal period when free market, neo-liberal policies have 
dominated the world economy (Fairhead, Leach, and 
Scoones, 2012; Corson, 2011, 2012; Corson and 
MacDonald, 2012; Wolford, 2010; Leach, Fairhead 
and Fraser, 2012; Cardenas, 2012; Benjaminsin and 
Bryceson, 2012; Gardner, 2012; Nalepa and Bauer, 
2012; Neimark, 2012; Seagle, 2012; Ybarra, 2012; 
Snijders, 2012; MaCarthy, Vel and Afiff, 2012; Tien-
haara, 2012; Baletti, 2012; Filer, 2012; Kelly, 2011; 
Nelson, 2010; Dressler et al., 2010; Goldman, 2011; 
Castree, 2008, 2010). A neoliberal view of the envi-
ronment prescribes the commoditization of nearly all 
aspects of the natural environment — essentially ren- 
dering nature for sale — along with the new institu-
tions and relationships that have accompanied this 
transition toward laissez-faire economics and politics 
(Buchler and Dressler, 2012; Leach, 2012). The lack 
of governmental involvement in the economy and in 
the environment has opened space for a dynamic, co-
mplex sociocultural process that involves state, cor-
porate, nongovernmental and local actors engaging in 
the perpetration of or resistance to green grabbing, at 
times interrelating in unexpected ways (Fletcher, 2010; 
Peck and Tickell, 2002; Grandia, 2007). Powerful in-
terests are emboldened due to lack of regulation to 
mobilize for purposes of accumulating land and other 
valuable assets while pursuing a green agenda that is 
purportedly advantageous to all stakeholders (Ojeda, 
2012, 2013). During such processes, indigenous pe-
ople may be expelled from their land against their will 
(Gardner, 2012; Patinkin, 2013; Grajales, 2011; Borra 
et al., 2011; Ojeda, 2012) or forced to become isolated, 
poorly paid manual laborers for corporate owners. 
G 
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Thus, green grabs harm people as well as the entire 
dynamics of ecosystems (McAfee, 2011; Sullivan, 
2009a, 2009b), and due to their complexities can be 
viewed as a social process rather than a particular act 
(Peluso and Lund, 2011; Sikor and Lund, 2009). 
Green grabbing has adopted a standard language that 
occasionally papers over differences between tradi-
tionally opposed groups; thus, the perception may per-
sist that resistance to green grabbing is muted, unde-
rstated, or non-existent.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nu-
anced ways in which the developing resistance to 
green grabbing has been carried out. The extant aca-
demic literature on the subject, in general, may men-
tion opposition in passing but to date, there are few if 
any efforts to critically and systematically examine the 
social dynamics of this process. We consider both 
what works and what fails during the process of oppo-
sition, as well as the social psychology of risk taking 
among both green grabbers and opponents. A way 
forward proffering the resistance is included in the 
conclusion. 
2. Political Ecology 
This paper employs a perspective called political ec-
ology that combines a concern for ecology along with 
the fundamental and critical concepts and methodolo-
gies of political economy. A central premise of this 
field of study is that political and economic institu-
tions provide the proper backdrop with which to con-
sider and analyze ecologies and how they change. 
Marxian economics stressed that the creation and per-
petuation of economic-political structures in early ca-
pitalism lent an advantage to a propertied, elite class at 
the expense of workers alienated from the means of 
production and dispossessed of its ownership. A 
process of “primitive accumulation” was significant in 
the establishment of this kind of unequal system of 
capitalist social relations. Common property was ab-
olished, and the commons were enclosed, thereby thi-
nking of commons as land, people, social structures or 
ideas (Marx and Engels, 1967). David Harvey (2005) 
further contended that primitive accumulation may be 
thought of today as “accumulation by dispossession,” 
a continuing process of capital accumulation on a 
world scale (De Angelis, 2001). Given the Marxian 
concern with crisis, a political ecology of green grab-
bing would not be complete without some notion of 
praxis toward a better society. Robbins (2004, p.12) 
wrote that political ecology has a “normative under-
standing that there are very likely better, less coercive, 
less exploitative, and more sustainable ways of doing 
things.” 
Marxian political economy provided the initial pr-
imary theoretical influence for political ecology, but 
postmodernism and post-structural theories subse-
quently injected fresh ideas into the field. For instance, 
there was a developing concern with the dimension of 
widespread and dispersed power over customary users 
of natural resources; the idea that nuanced networked 
assemblages may work both to promote and resist 
green grabbing; and that a rhizomatic structure of re-
lations may be present among both grabbers and re-
sistors (Rocheleau, 2015; Foucault, 1991; Latour, 
2007; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Given the fluidity 
of post-structuralist theory, land grabbing or green 
grabbing may defy definition or exploration by any of 
one of these lines of thought, and may be explained by 
processes that appear to be more nonlinear than linear.  
Pearce and Warford (1993) argued that putting a 
monetary price on nature might well help to preserve 
it. However, doing so caught the attention of neo-lib-
erals that saw privatization and commoditization of 
these resources as being essential to a careful ste-
wardship of natural resources and more efficient than 
the idea of the commons. Hardin (1968), in a seminal 
work on the commons, parallels this view, re-con-
ceptualizing public goods as scarce commodities that 
require either privatization or strong state control. En-
couraged by opportunities to effect the “greening” of 
environments damaged by natural disasters (Klein, 
2007), there emerged a belief that bettering the envi-
ronment was good for business and that greening and 
profits could coexist with minimal conflicts. 
Given this intellectually tolerant attitude toward 
pricing out ecosystems, the commoditization of the 
environment proceeded during the 1980s and 1990s, but 
it was the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment of 
2005 that signaled the popularity of such practices, 
giving rise to an effort to try and assign prices to every 
natural service (Leach, 2012). What followed was the 
construction of payment schemes for various ecosys-
tem services from biodiversity and agrofuels to carbon 
storage and aesthetic and tourism values. Opportuni-
ties for infrastructure development through the crea-
tion of special economic zones further fueled ecosys-
tem sellouts (Fairhead, Leach, and Scoones, 2012; 
Borras and Franco, 2012; Levien, 2012; GRAIN, 
2013). Consequently, since 2008, nations in the indu-
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strialized north, China, and the Middle East found a 
renewed interest in investing in land and resources in 
low-income countries. That, according to Leach (2012), 
“has given rise to a phenomenon of land-grabbing in 
which large areas of land in the developing world 
are being parceled off for food and biofuels, often 
with very negative effects on land rights for the people 
who live there.”   
Three important issues have led to an increase in 
the phenomenon of green grabbing. First, most of the 
governments selling off their ecosystem services were 
impoverished, desperate for money, and definitely in 
such a position as to be taken advantage of by green 
grabbers (Leach, 2012). Concurrently, more affluent 
nations were motivated to buy up land for outsourced 
food and biomass production after the dual crippling 
fiscal shocks of the 2008 financial and food crises 
(Blas and Wallis, 2009). The payment schemes were 
obscure and complicated, which made it extremely 
tough for governments or indigenous peoples without 
sophisticated technological knowledge to understand 
the implications and social costs of the signed con-
tracts. Nonetheless, poorer nations were eager to sign 
away rights to their ecosystems in hopes of getting 
quick cash that might lead to economic development 
and prosperity. 
Second, the agreements tended to be constructed 
and justified in such a way that there was an assump-
tion that forests were being lost fast and that local 
people were to blame for it (Leach, 2012). Traditional, 
indigenous farming practices were viewed as some-
thing that stalled the arc of progress or got in the way 
of it. Peasants that fed the world for millennia were 
now being cast as backward, inefficient and obstacles 
to development. They may be branded as culturally 
inauthentic, or falsely accused as violent criminals 
(Rocheleau, 2015). Such perceptions fed a rebirth of 
some older philosophies about conservation that fa-
vored shutting people out of forest areas. The forest 
carbon schemes, in particular, appear to lock local 
residents out of forests because the carbon stocks have 
to stay put, and this precludes most human involve-
ment with the forests. Thus, this is a new kind of co-
lonization (Leach, 2012; Peluso and Lund, 2011; Va-
ndergeest and Peluso, 1995). Small farms and village 
that thrived alongside nature are “now being repla-
ced by a landscape of grabbed concessions and people, 
if they have any rights at all, are being reduced to la-
borers in ecosystems in which they no longer have any 
value” (Leach, 2012). The discursive element to this 
argument is so convincing as to imply that such colo-
nization is like a juggernaut of modernity (Giddens, 
1990; Backhouse, 2014), a process that is inevitable. 
Third, new actors and configurations entered into 
the accelerated quest for more green projects. For 
example, there was a mistaken tendency to assume 
that the most recent wave of green grabs that com-
menced after 2005 was simply an expansion of old 
contract farming models that had served well the likes 
of Dole, Unilever or other more traditional plantation 
or agribusiness companies (GRAIN, 2009). In reality, 
what happened was that the high-powered finance ind-
ustry, with little to no experience in farming, emerged 
as a crucial corporate player. Speculative capital is in 
search for high returns after the housing bubble burst. 
This financial capital “is even more volatile, moves 
even faster and has even less relation to the land than 
productive capital of other industrial sectors” (Draitser, 
2014). Further, some of the investment monies were 
coming from the Global South, thus disrupting the 
usual narrative of the exploitative relationship be-
tween North and South (Wallerstein, 1974). 
Conceptually, land grabbing and green grabbing 
live in a socially constructed workspace where the two 
concepts are difficult to disentangle. Land grabbi-
ng became an important issue in the 2008 financial 
crisis as mid-level economies such as South Korea 
and Saudi Arabia sought to acquire large land holdings 
in the developing world — places like Ethiopia and 
Madagascar — amidst efforts to provide food security 
in an era of fear. The idea was picked up by interna-
tional development groups which helped to reinforce 
this framing (Transnational Institute, 2012). Thus, it 
was logical to think that nearly all land grabs, as natu-
ral resources, could be construed as green grabs, espe-
cially when justified by such progressive concepts as 
food security and biodiversity. The grab is more likely 
to be perceived as a green grab, however, when the 
primary motive shifts to rent seeking ecosystem com-
moditization, as when lands are obtained and closed 
off to secure land to enhance profits while raising bio-
fuels or to use the land for development of tourism. 
The grab may be initiated in and obscurely embedded 
within the complex technical language of national or 
transnational climate protection measures. Its distinc-
tive character may also be reflective of the unusual 
new alliances developing among NGOs, the private 
sector, states, and development agencies, as well as by 
specific legitimating strategies. However, not all green 
grabs may include land; they may involve increasingly 
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complex technological items such as product certifica-
tions, satellite photos, GIS programs, and other elec-
tronic or administrative spaces which corporations 
may profit from that do not explicitly require land 
acquisition.  
3. Nodes of Resistance to Green Grabbing 
Several types of resistance can be identified and clas-
sified based on the kind of strategy that is used in the 
resisting process. The resistance options range from 
purposely minimal efforts to countermand the green 
grab, to active, forceful, multi-actor, discursively de-
legitimizing kinds of opposition. As nodes of resis-
tance, these are not distinct types but rather action 
centers that are amenable to sharing of interests 
and bridge-building among groups, no matter how 
awkward the alliances may initially appear. NGOs are 
at the forefront of gathering and presenting data about 
resistance. Academics have been somewhat slow to 
synthesize, analyze and provide a broader social con-
text for the data collected.  
3.1 Transnational Activism  
Organizations fought green grabs and land grabs by 
assisting small farmers and social movements in their 
struggles to maintain community control over biodi-
versity-based food systems. A Barcelona-based inter-
national nonprofit, GRAIN, is an example. It advo-
cates for change favoring small farmers and indigen-
ous farming practices. GRAIN brings resources to the 
table that locals may not possess: independent re-
search and analysis; and alliance building — both very 
useful skill sets that connect socially marginalized far-
mers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to larger net-
works. Working with other socio-environmental jus-
tice movements and organizations around themes such 
as agrofuels, forestry, food sovereignty and climate 
justice, GRAIN has assisted in building up a transna-
tional contentious discourse that has had a significant 
impact on the positions of international governance 
institutions concerned with agriculture, including the 
World Bank, the UN Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Food (Pye, 
2010; Rosset and Martinez-Torres, 2005; Holifield, 
2004; Castree, 2011).  
GRAIN has successfully mobilized indigenous peo-
ple and other locals, educating them on the dangers of 
green grabbing, and the effect of this practice on their 
communities. GRAIN supported the first international 
peasants’ conference in 2011 took place in Nyéléni, 
Mali. Over 250 peasants, pastoralists, indigenous pe-
oples and their allies from 30 countries participated. 
The declaration they issued adopted an aggressively 
rights-based discourse and a strong environmental ju-
stice framing in defense of “food sovereignty, the co-
mmons and the rights of small-scale food providers to 
natural resources” (EJOLT, 2014, p.59). Framing the 
fight against land grabbing as a struggle against capi-
talism, neo-liberalism, and a destructive economic 
model, participants reiterated that they were not inter-
ested in “getting a better deal” but rather in a trans-
formational project, a radical politics or “counter- he-
gemonic globalization.” In its March 2014 report, 
EJOLT noted that this was a stop and roll back ap-
proach (Borras and Franco, 2012; McMichael, 2012), 
as contrasted with a more moderate and cautious “ec-
ological modernization” approach of some other gro-
ups (EJOLT, 2014, p.59).   
Another organization called Nature Kenya played 
an aggressive role in preventing land and green grab-
bing in the Tana River Delta. The Delta is a patchwork 
of the Tana River plus palm savanna, seasonally 
flooded grassland, forest fragments, lakes, and man-
groves. This sensitive ecosystem supports several co-
mmunities as well as livestock, wildlife, and wa-
ter birds. The people have adapted their lifestyle to 
seasonal extremes, cultivating on receding lake edges, 
seasonally fertile floodplains where the river spills 
fresh water into their field with the tidal flow. If un-
disturbed, this wetland acts like a sponge, absorbing 
food, storing water and remaining green during the 
dry season. When the delta floods, it fills with water 
making it an ideal setting for water birds and a place 
where Kenya’s bird population is replenished (Nature 
Kenya, 2016). Agricultural schemes such as biofuel or 
sugar projects risk disrupting the sensitive water bal-
ance of the region, leaving the land and its people 
prone to the ravages of flood and drought and salt wa-
ter intrusion. 
In August, 2010 communities living in the Tana Ri-
ver Delta went to the High Court in Malindi seeking 
orders against all the planned agricultural projects in 
the Delta, including those of the Tana Integrated Sugar 
Project (which would purportedly lead to gains in em-
ployment, sugar production, ethanol and electric pow-
er, and infrastructure) and TARDA (Tana and Athi 
Rivers Development Authority), a project set up to 
grow rice and maize for national food. Nature Kenya 
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and the East African Wild Life Society paid lawyers, 
filing costs and other litigation costs related to the 
orders (EJOLT, 2014). Representing the communities 
were three farmers, three pastoralists, three fishermen 
and three conservationists. These locals were seeking 
the court to compel the companies to develop, in con-
sultation with all stakeholders, a master plan for land 
use, development, livelihoods and ecological protec-
tion of the Delta. On February 4, 2013 the High Court 
in Nairobi ruled mostly in favor of the community 
petition, specifying the need for one agency to oversee 
the development of the Tana Delta; and TARDA was 
tasked with developing, with full participation of the 
community and other stakeholders, land use develop-
ment plans for the projects that were to be carried out 
within 45 days of the ruling date. Additionally, Nature 
Kenya worked to secure Tana Delta’s designation as a 
Ramsar site, which guaranteed its protection by an in-
ternational treaty that conserves and sustains wetlands. 
Nature Kenya also contributed to the blocking of 
several more green grabbing projects that were sche-
duled to start up concurrently with TISP and TARDA. 
G4 Industries abandoned their project while Bedford 
Biofuels cultivated only about one tenth of the 10,000 
hectares set aside for Jatropha. Flow Energy Limited 
restricted its oil and gas exploration sites. Many 
project proponents cited investor shyness after be-
coming targets of environmental campaigns. This suc-
cess cannot be underrated because the Delta has re-
mained in a more or less intact state — a major win 
for biodiversity and communities (EJOLT, 2014). 
The best time of intervention, it appears, is before pro-
jects start; otherwise, it becomes difficult to stop the 
momentum of a project as it moves forward.  
Other attempts at organizational resistance have met 
with success, but the methods to achieve victory were 
different. For example, the promotion of agrofuels as a 
green strategy has been controversial and subject to 
resistance in the form of organized protests (Back-
house, 2014). Protesters against green grabbing me-
rged with some other social movements to help topple 
host governments or to convince governments to can-
cel projects. One corporate strategy to reduce criticism 
of agrofuels is to plant the crops for agrofuels in so- 
called degraded areas to prevent a shortage of foods-
tuffs or the deforestation of primary forests. A de-
graded area is one that has already sustained environ-
mental damage. Placing an agrofuel project in such an 
area would serve as a way to prevent any further 
damage to the environment. The World Bank contends 
that there are areas ripe for such a green strategy, es-
timating that the area of currently uncultivated, non-
forested land that would be ecologically suitable for 
rainfed cultivation in sparsely populated areas at ap-
proximately 445 million hectares worldwide (Deinen-
ger et al., 2011). In Brazil, the main cultivation areas 
are ones already deforested, preferably degraded gra-
zing land in the Amazonian state of Para. These areas, 
however, can be the basis for livelihoods of peasants 
or traditional local communities. 
According to Backhouse (2014), African palm was 
brought to Brazil by African slaves 400 years ago. It 
was introduced into the Amazon basin for the first 
time by researchers in 1942 and from the 1970s on-
ward was promoted by the military dictatorship as part 
of its Amazon development policy. Between 2002 and 
2006 at the federal state level, pilot projects were in-
itiated in Para to integrate peasants into the palm oil 
sector using farming contracts. Comprehensive state 
support for the Brazilian palm oil section did not be-
gin until 2010, however, with the state program for 
sustainable palm oil production. In this program, the 
Brazilian government combined national energy and 
development policy goals. The labor intensive oil 
palm plantations were to create work and market ac-
cess for small contract farms and in this way contri-
bute to the development of impoverished rural regions. 
Contracts specified a guarantee to include peasant 
agriculture in the project. If enterprises commit them-
selves to buying 15 percent of their palm oil from the 
peasants, this part of the agreement will entitle them to 
special sales conditions on the national biodiesel market 
and free them from taxes. There was also an argument 
favoring the environment. The project, framed as a 
strategy of CO2 avoidance through the prevention of 
deforestation and the agricultural use of already al-
tered lands, is intended to contribute to Brazil’s vo-
luntary climate protection goals. Approximately 32 
million hectares were zoned as suitable for oil palm 
planting, creating opportunities for green grabbing. 
On the ground, positions on the contracts varied. They 
were regarded either as a unique chance in the strug-
gle against rural poverty or part of an expropriation 
strategy that would expel families and communities 
from their land. Some peasants wished unconditional-
ly to take part in this product; others were hesitant; 
others were strictly opposed, involving themselves in 
associations and neighborhood groups against contract 
farming production.  
Given this ambivalence toward resistance, by 2013, 
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no politically organized opposition to the state palm 
oil program had been formed (Backhouse, 2014). 
There were no political alliances formed between crit-
ical factions of the rural population, the trade unions, 
and social movements. No public hearings and no en-
vironmental impact statements were filed. In some 
places the conditions for political resistance do not 
exist: in some of the expansion areas, parts of the 
peasant population are socially so marginalized that 
they have neither places for political articulation nor 
state or civil society centers for dealing with their de-
mands or complaints. Civil society actors hardly exist 
outside of the agricultural trade unions in the entire 
case study region. By the end of 2013, there was no 
consistent voice opposing the expansion, and some of 
the trade unionists spoke for it. The biggest issue was 
the way the program was pitched: it was without al-
ternative and inevitable. As Backhouse (2014) con-
cluded, only because it is widely accepted, from local 
to transnational political forms, that degraded areas 
should be developed agro-industrially for the protec-
tion of the tropical forest, can the local population’s 
participation rights, and environmental laws, be cir-
cumvented by the large-scale extension of plantations, 
without causing transnational protest as in the case of 
other large projects in Amazonia. 
In Malaysia, accounts of observers on the ground 
suggest that palm oil projects similar to the one in 
Brazil lead to the social precaritization of the workers 
as reflected in temporary employment, insecure and 
low wages, outsourcing and subcontracting, and a lack 
of political and social rights (Pye, 2015). The Malay-
sian project differed in that many of the workers re-
cruited for labor in the project were immigrants from 
neighboring countries. Some of the workers from 
these projects tell horrific stories of debt bondage, vio-
lently enforced labor, political repression, and caning. 
However, other workers tell different stories, claiming 
to work according to collective agreements and indeed 
saving money which they invest in a house or a small 
holding back home. Thus, control of the state or the 
corporation over the plantation labor is far from com-
plete, as was the case in Brazil. 
Workers in Malaysia developed innovative resis-
tance strategies that could be described occupying a 
middle ground between acquiescence and open revolt 
(Pye, 2015). Special export zones prevented labor or-
ganizations from developing, but workers found a way 
through “everyday resistance” to produce transnation-
al spaces of social reproduction. First, workers found 
means to permeate and neutralize Malaysia’s borders. 
Hundreds of thousands of migrants actively chal-
lenged the Malaysian state’s right to impose border 
controls and found ways of circumventing the official 
prescriptions and restrictions regarding permits, pass-
ports, health checks, and children. At times, this meant 
illegal entry, but also stealthier means were employed 
such as using multiple passports and entering legally 
under a different name or forging birth certificates to 
gain resident rights. A second strategy was to abscond 
to work in places that paid higher wages. Subterranean 
networks offered information on current pay rates, 
experiences of good and bad employers, and, in gen-
eral, the information infrastructure needed to move 
around and secure employment elsewhere. Third, 
workers engaged in wildcat strikes. Empowered by the 
success of the first two strategies, workers were em-
boldened to try out more direct approaches to deal 
with poor employer practices. At one mill in Sabah, 
the Indonesian workforce went on strike when they 
did not receive a promised wage increase, the in-
crease being allocated instead to office workers, most 
of whom were Malaysian citizens. 
3.2 Networked Resistance  
Networked resistance allows both previously existing 
and newly created networks in opposition to green 
grabs to combine their efforts to oppose a certain 
project. In many cases, the systems were not formed 
in opposition to green grabbing per se, but may have 
arisen from concerns about variegated social concerns 
and problems. Mexico provided a case where an-
ti-green grab concerns merged with other groups in 
often unpredictable ways, causing some writers to br-
ing up the metaphor of a rhizome, a rootstock from 
which roots form and coalesce in diverse ways to 
produce a healthy plant. Chiapas, Mexico was a place 
where such rhizomatic resistance developed. The state 
was characterized by an agricultural economy, low 
land values, low wages, and despite poverty, was rich 
in mineral, energy and forest resources, and scenic 
wonders, all of which became the targets of a host of 
actors from investors to conservation organizations, 
the tourism industry, mining interests, industrial agri 
culture giants and alternative energy developers (Ro-
cheleau, 2015). Chiapas was singled out by former 
Mexican President Felipe Calderon, and the former 
Governor, Juan Sabines, as the place for a pilot project 
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for the regional development initiative formerly kno-
wn as Plan Puebla Panama (PPP), now the Mesoame-
rica Project. The multi-lateral effort at regional inte-
gration committed Mexico, Central America, Colom-
bia and the Dominican Republic to joint ventures by 
state and private capital, with significant U.S. partici-
pation. The initiative focused on transportation, tele-
communications, and energy infrastructure, with much 
of the power destined for mining and manufacturing 
industries, as well as energy consumers in the U.S. 
Critics noted the neoliberal model of development and 
the potential harm to local communities and the envi-
ronment. The critics insisted that the actual goals of 
the project were the privatization of land, including 
farmland, as well as water and public services, and the 
control of the region by foreign interests. Further, they 
argued that the Mesoamerica Project was destroying 
fragile rainforests and displacing indigenous people 
who have little voice in the project. 
In 1994, a broad social movement coalesced around 
the struggle for land and territory, with the Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation, and the related auto-
nomous civilian communities preeminent among them. 
The Zapatistas timed their uprising on January 1, 1994, 
in direct response to the implementation of NAFTA on 
that date, and the related assaults on agrarian com-
munities and communal property. Other groups resist-
ing the counter-reforms and supporting recuperation 
of peasant and indigenous lands included Christian 
ecclesiastical base communities, the pacifist Catholic 
communities, peasant and indigenous associations, 
rural artisans’ and farmers’ unions, some directly and 
others indirectly allied with the Zapatistas, and some 
not at all. The Liberation Theology wing of the Catho-
lic Church supported the land struggle with several 
thousand catechists who served as rural community 
organizers and human rights promoters. A Bishop in 
San Cristobal took a lead in convening peace negotia-
tions between the government and the Zapatistas and 
in guaranteeing the safety of the latter. “A diverse ar-
ray of national and international civil society organi-
zations rapidly coalesced around these groups forming 
locally rooted and internationally networked solidarity 
movements, including religious, indigenous, peasant, 
feminist, human rights and, to some extent, environ-
mental networks” (Rocheleau, 2015, p.699). These 
networks would later join in the fight against green 
grabbing. 
The most relevant element of the Mesoamerica Pr-
oject concerning green grabs in Chiapas is the Palen-
que Integrated Planned Center (hereafter CIPP), a co-
mbined conservation and tourism initiative originated 
in 2000 by President Vicente Fox. Although popular 
resistance initially delayed the project, it surfaced 
again as a flagship project of both President Calderon 
and Governor Sabines. CIPP was planned as a first 
rate inland tourism archipelago of archeological sites, 
pristine forest stands and scenic waterfalls and lakes, 
in a green sea of biodiversity conservation, carbon 
storage, and other environmentally sound practices. 
Various government officials further evoked visions of 
“Cancun in the rainforest” and “Disneyland in the 
rainforest” (Rocheleau, 2015, p.703). This profit 
seeking vision served to legitimate eviction of indi-
genous people by appealing to notions of environ-
mental protection and public interest. The push to se-
cure territorial reserves for the CIPP also facilitated 
the removal of oppositional communities from the 
vicinity of planned commercial and industrial devel-
opment, under the twin pretexts of national and global 
nature conservation and tourism as a clean, green de-
velopment mechanism. During this process, as another 
necessary prelude to dispossession is “the reclassifica-
tion of indigenous and campesino groups and particu-
lar communities to delegitimize them and justify de-
territorialization. Various federal and state agencies, 
environmental NGOs and commercial interests, inclu-
ding mass media, collaborate directly and indirectly to 
recode the status of land and people and the identities 
of multiple, entangled territories” (Rocheleau, 2015, 
p.704).  
Rocheleau (2015, p.706) concludes that CIPP 
has been met with “distributed, coordinated, nonvio-
lent territorial resistance by indigenous and campesino 
communities, supported by continuing and resurgent 
social movements and civil society networks, and 
global solidarity initiatives.” By contrast, more radical 
green organizations, such as Maderas and Otros Mu-
ndos, were unable to form coalitions at the local level, 
with the result that their critical environmental narra-
tives, which are similar to those of major environ-
mental organizations, found little local resonance. The 
success of specific environmental discourses is related 
to the effectiveness of political practices, especially 
the ability to form coalitions.  
3.3 Intellectual Resistance 
Intellectual resistance occurs when activists put their 
technological knowledge of project means and me-
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thods toward the task of stopping work on a project. It 
can be an effective weapon, but one needs insider 
knowledge of project plans and how they work for  
individual companies in given countries. For example, 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are a stan-
dard technical requirement needed before green grab 
projects can begin. In the Western view, these assess-
ments may be used to delay or halt a project. In the 
developing world where green grabs are most likely to 
occur, they are often viewed as a simple paper re-
quirement needed before project startup, and not a 
means of stopping any project. Indigenous people 
must rely on outside help to question perfunctory or 
illegitimate EIAs. For example, in Kenya EIAs are 
often considered as a formal procedure that appears on 
a ‘to do’ list before project implementation (EJOLT, 
2014, p.34; Mbonde, 2012). From a company’s 
standpoint, there are many strategies to subvert an 
EIA, starting with the selection of the consultants who 
will perform it. In the case of the Tana Integrated 
Sugar Project, the company, well known for selling 
irrigation equipment, had no experience in conducting 
EIAs (Duvial et al., 2012). Because of its complexities, 
the EIA report is a technical document which many 
communities and even some professionals are not able 
to comprehend. With literacy levels in Tana Delta sta-
nding at 34% it is doubtful that anyone in these com-
munities has the knowledge to give meaningful feed-
back to EIAs. Thus, local communities must depend 
on information given by EIA consultants and their 
leaders. Most times both leaders and EIA consultants 
are advocates for the projects. “Consultants are 
paid by the developer making it difficult for them to 
recommend that their ‘employer’ should not proceed 
with a project. It is quite common to see EIAs that 
appreciate profound impacts of projects with no miti-
gation measures and still recommend that the project 
should proceed” (EJOLT, 2014, p.35). Stakeholder 
consultative meetings are often called in secrecy 
without informing organizations that are seen to be 
troublesome such as environmental NGOs and other 
opponents. Even consultations with local communities 
who would bear the full brunt of impacts are often 
at best severely inadequate. As is true elsewhere in 
Kenya, projects proposed in the Tana Delta may enjoy 
political patronage and privileges at very high levels. 
As such investors may feel they do not have to meet 
required legal conditions as they are already assured by 
powerful people that their projects will proceed.  
A second example of how intellectual resistance 
can work involves forest carbon schemes such as the 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation program (REDD), where forests are pro-
tected as a means of offsetting carbon polluting prac-
tices elsewhere in the world. In south Liberia, a Brit-
ish company attempted to obtain a deal with the gov-
ernment for 400,000 hectares or 1,000 acres of pristine 
rainforest that would serve as a carbon offset (Leach, 
2012). The contract as written did not specify what 
percentage of the carbon market revenue would return 
to Liberia’s government, nor was their mention of 
what might happen to indigenous peoples that still 
lived in or near the forest and used it for hunting and 
to support their daily livelihoods. A development aid 
worker from Monrovia read the contract and advised 
the government that Liberia was not benefitted at all 
from the contract, and it was canceled. 
The intellectual practice called sustainability certi-
fication provides still another way that certain non- 
state entities claim the authority to make rules on en-
vironmental and social processes in specified spaces, 
and to reward producers who can demonstrate adhe-
rence to these rules with access to markets for certi-
fied products (Vandergeest, Ponte and Bush, 2015). 
Certification is intended to create market values and 
manage market risks through the use of sustainability 
labels. “The label ‘fixes’ a variety of spaces into one 
commodified sustainable form, by fixing ecological 
(and social) problems and setting this repair symboli-
cally into an ecolabel or logo that has exchange 
and brand value. Sustainability certifications are dis-
tinct from the market-oriented conservation programs 
which are often the focus of the green-grabbing lite-
rature, but can be understood as a form of green grab-
bing in how sustainability certification has been pre-
sented by its proponents as an ideal mechanism for 
selling nature to save it, and thus as a clear expression 
of a market logic in environmental governance” (p. 2). 
Coffee drinkers may be familiar with coffee certifica-
tion, which suggests that certain brands of coffee meet 
specific sustainability standards to be certified as 100 
percent Columbian or Arabican. Such processes are 
currently being employed to certify seafood, and it is 
just a matter of time before parcels of land are simi-
larly identified and approved using such high tech 
methods as satellite imagery to ensure compliance. 
These methods are probably beyond the intellectual or 
technological capabilities of most indigenous peoples, 
thus, intellectual activism from the outside is a trea-
sured resource. 
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3.4 Local/Cultural Resistance 
Resistance may emerge more or less spontaneously at 
the local level, with help from concerned activists who 
know from long experience how useful it is to chal-
lenge projects early. For example, in the East Ugandan 
rainforest an area called the Mabira Forest had been 
protected by the government since 1932. In 2007 Ug-
andan President Yoweli Kaguta Museveni reversed 
course, deciding to allocate one-third of the rainforest 
to the Sugar Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL) 
for the purpose of growing sugarcane. The govern-
ment predicted that this plan would produce 3,500 
jobs and boost Uganda’s collected tax revenues (see 
generally Global Nonviolent Action Base, 2007). A 
campaign called Save Mabira Crusade in opposition to 
this plan appeared only two days after the announce-
ment. Campaign sponsors believed that deforestation 
would promote climate change that would be danger-
ous to the economy. Environmentalists agreed, saying 
that the plan might reduce rainfall, would threaten rare 
species of birds and trees, and that planting sugarcane 
would lead to soil erosion. Buoyed by the support, the 
coalition opposing deforestation grew to include other 
interested stakeholders. It planned a protest walk from 
the capital, Kampala, to Jinja district where Mabira 
forest is located — almost 83 kilometers. Police tried 
to use force to stop the walk and arrest coalition lead-
ers. Pushing and shoving began between police and 
protestors, after which police shot their weapons in the 
air to intimidate the crowd. A riot broke out as de-
monstrators fought back, throwing stones and injuring 
one of the police. Police then shot into the crowd, with 
at least one fatality, and arrested about 20 of the de-
monstrators. After the arrests, the notoriety of the pro-
test grew, drawing even more to the cause. By October 
19 it was clear that the campaigners had won and the 
Mabira Forest, at least for a time, was saved. However, 
the celebrations were somewhat premature as the for-
est was once again threatened in 2011. 
Aboriginal groups are sometimes lured to neoliber-
al projects with the promise of making money and the 
prospect of sharing in the rewards of development. In 
Tanzania, the government took over areas of land that 
were once the common property grazing land of Mas-
sai pastoralists and sold them to private companies 
marketing the wildlife values of ecotourism on those 
lands (Leach, 2012). Pastoralists were excluded from 
land that was customarily used for grazing ani-
mals, but at the same time, some were intrigued by the 
idea of making money. According to reports, local 
actors including the pastoralists did not initially resist 
such projects by the private sector and the states. 
However, the newly formed Wildlife Management 
Areas became centers of conflict whereby locals used 
the structure of the WMA as a forum to contest the 
state and advocate on the behalf of indigenous groups. 
Neoliberalization was therefore simultaneously ado-
pted and challenged (Gardner, 2012; Benjaminsin et 
al., 2013; Green and Adams, 2015).  
In some lands, locals may find that city dwellers 
move to their area in search of a “rural paradise” far 
away from city noise and congestion — a phenome-
non known as the neo-rural movement. These new-
comers arrive with good intentions, wanting to help 
out with environmentally sound practices and volun-
teering their time and energy to contribute to these 
projects. Unfortunately, these outsider ideas about 
conservation may mirror the same corporate green 
projects that the locals are already opposing, leading 
to friction. Neo-rural activists have been known to su-
pport restrictions on farming, grazing, and fishing. 
These changes in land use would have a direct impact 
on natives’ livelihoods (Cortes-Vazquez, 2012; Cortes- 
Vazquez and Zedalis, 2013; Valcuende, Quintero, and 
Cortes-Vasquez, 2011). The resulting animosity by 
locals towards conservation is interpreted by 
neo-rurals as either their incapability to appreciate the 
park’s natural values, a lack of environmental educa-
tion, or a selfish attitude towards nature (Cortes-Vazquez, 
2012).  
Local opposition to green projects is not restricted 
to developing nations. A type of radical localism and 
advocacy against environmental projects or regula-
tions has been observed in the First World. Some rural 
residents of the American West that adhere to the Wise 
Use philosophy and movement show a similar pattern 
of opposition. Wise Use is a coalition of groups pro-
moting the expansion of private property rights and 
reduced regulation of publicly held property by gov-
ernments. McCarthy (2002) makes a compelling case 
that these marginalized locals who are resisting inter-
ventions by scientific experts, governmental agencies, 
and transnational environmental organizations do so in 
a manner that is remarkably like the resistance in de-
veloping nations (Peluso, 1993). 
3.5 Financial-legal Activism  
Financial activism occurs when concerned people and 
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groups point out to investors the pitfalls of investing 
in a green project. Financial activists like to say that 
green grab projects may self-destruct on their own 
without human resistance due to unanticipated flaws 
in the planning process and the unintended conse-
quences that appear as the project is executed. The 
idea or strategy of the project may be flawed. Land 
negotiations with the host country may be difficult, or 
the host country’s approval process may be unwieldy, 
leading to delays (Filer, 2012). The timing of the 
project may be poor, or the investment strategy relied 
upon to fund the project may fail due to fluctuating 
commodity prices, leading to the decision to abort the 
project. For example, during the development of palm 
oil plantations in Brazil in 1980, the promotion of bio-
diesel from palm oil was planned in imitation of the 
Proalcool program. However, because of technical 
problems and falling oil prices, the program ceased 
to be pursued at the end of the 1980s and the palm oil 
project in the Amazon basin was regarded to be a fail-
ure (Pye, 2015).  
Financial activism directed at institutional investors 
has also had some success in disrupting futures trad-
ing in commodities (including food commodities). A 
coalition of family farm, faith-based and anti-hunger 
groups targeted CALSTRS, the California teachers’ 
retirement system. CALSTRS had been considering 
shifting $2.5 billion of their portfolio into commodi-
ties. In response to the campaign, the CALSTRS board 
decided to invest no more than $150 million in com-
modities for 18 months (GRAIN, 2011a). Similar 
campaigns targeting banks and governments in Europe 
have achieved results. By 2013, eleven European ba-
nks withdrew investments in agricultural commodities 
following activist pressure (GRAIN, 2011a). 
Legal activism is the filing of lawsuits that might 
prevent a green project from going forward. In an Ar-
gentine project in Rio Negro Province, the Mapuche 
were contemplating filing an amparo or legal relief 
action to halt the investment in land by Beidahuang 
China, arguing that the rights of the original peoples 
were not taken into account (GRAIN, 2011b). The 
Mapuche were also denied the right to free prior in-
formed consent, arguing that this right is granted in 
ILO Convention 169, which Argentina ratified. The 
Río Negro provincial government had framed the 
Chinese project as a “food production agreement” and 
as an investment in irrigation resources in the lower 
valley of the province. It claimed that this was needed 
given the national government’s failure to fund irriga-
tion infrastructure. Critics contended the agreement 
was just a land giveaway for industrial soy production, 
with the Chinese company granted some free, uncon-
ditional benefits. Further, environmental experts in the 
province denounced the project as a form of “ecocide”. 
There were high environmental and health impacts 
projected in an area that already suffered from low na-
tural precipitation and extremely limited water avai-
lability. They additionally pointed to irregularities in 
the Province's zoning of native forests which would 
allow the project to go ahead (GRAIN, 2011b). 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The evidence suggests that early intervention by tran-
snational activist organizations has been a helpful tool 
in delaying or canceling green grab projects. There is 
sometimes a domino effect in this process: as one pr-
oject falls, others companies decide to quit their plans 
as well. Thus, investor confidence in green projects 
can be shaken by the negative experiences of other 
investors. An important factor to note, however, is that 
a successful early blockage may be short-lived; it may 
not be the end of the story. Out off seventeen halted 
projects referenced by GRAIN (EJOLT, 2014), three 
gained new life when projects were relocated or tran-
sferred to other companies. Such developments are a 
noteworthy signal to be vigilant over the long term in 
efforts to stop projects.  
A quantitative study of mining projects that were 
contested over environmental concerns bore some gr-
im news for those trying to stop green projects (EJO-
LT, 2015). Projects were less likely to be stopped 
when well-connected and influential firms became 
involved in the conflict, or when internecine conflicts 
were present such as corruption, repression and dis-
placement of activists, criminalization and violent 
targeting of activists, all signaling a powerful and su-
ppressive state. No project was stopped in a low-in-
come country, underlining the financial vulnerability 
of poorer countries to the pro-development pitch of 
green companies seeking land.  
There is a strong need for discursive practices that 
challenge the dominant narrative by delegitimation. 
The literature suggested that some projects have taken 
on the aura of inevitability, have been sold to both 
investors and locals as a triple win — something good 
for business, good for the environment and good for 
securing a piece of the development pie for local 
people. Delegitimizing discourses can disrupt the tra-
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jectory of this rhetoric and ultimately have the power 
to erode the moral basis for investing in green 
projects by challenging them from below. These dis-
courses contain economic, political and social or mor-
al codes that may change perceptions of green grab-
bing projects both at the individual and societal levels 
of analysis. Companies are known to react to “sham-
ing” discourses, especially while the project is young. 
It is better for them to cut losses than to become em-
barrassed with a negative result. 
Virtually nowhere in the green grabbing literature is 
there a discussion of the sufferings of workers in some 
green projects. It has been documented that there are 
20.9 million slaves in the world, two-thirds of them 
working in construction and agriculture (Timmerman, 
2014), including both children and adults. Some 
slaves suffer the additional indignities of being sex-
ually abused and arbitrarily shuttled around the world 
in human trafficking networks. To what extent does 
this deplorable activity occur at the sites of green grab 
projects? The answer is not clear at present. There is 
strong suspicion that this is occurring because states 
that accept green projects are also home to slavery. 
When confronted with this evidence, there is a strong 
moral obligation for activists and researchers to do 
whatever is possible to protect these vulnerable indi-
viduals. However, there are some risks and social 
costs that may be incurred by activists should they 
intervene to rectify such a situation. Rocheleau (2015, 
p.716), reflecting on the situation in Mexico, writes 
that the resistance (to green grabbing and associated 
societal ills) has meant a “long list of dead and disap-
peared persons, many of them promising leaders and 
all of them someone’s friend, relative, spouse or tea-
cher. There is also the sacrifice of time and energy 
diverted from building, raising crops and livestock, 
teaching and learning. The question remains as to 
whether rural communities in Chiapas will have to 
continue to pay such a high price to resist the vast, 
violent, networked green land grab.” 
Secondarily, there is a need for transnational activ-
ists and organizations to continue to get involved wh-
enever possible in instances of local resistance. These 
organizations are best able to build bridges to, and 
support, all the other nodes of resistance and especially 
local resistance. By doing so, they connect the prob-
lems of locals to larger social structures, thus rendering 
them “glocal” conflicts (Mills, 1959; Swynegedouw, 
1997). Networks such as GRAIN and World Rainfor-
est Movement frame local issues and distribute them 
into the public eye and to a larger cadre of networks, 
and can turn conversations about green projects into 
contentious discourses over the human toll of green 
projects. 
Finally, there is a need for continued nuanced study 
of green grabbing employing a political ecology pers-
pective. This paper is merely the beginning of this 
process, one example of how political ecology can 
frame and analyze the accumulation of land for green 
dollars, and can articulate conditions for resistance 
which may not have been contemplated, especially to 
the community of scholars outside of the field of geo-
graphy which has been somewhat slow to respond to 
this crisis. We are just beginning to understand what 
makes resistance successful. For instance, the degree 
of democracy in the state, the availability of the rule 
of law and institutional spaces for protest appear to 
favor resistance. Other variables that need more careful 
study include the nationality or ethnicity of the green 
grabbers, the presence of indigenous peoples, and the 
nature of the commodity or commodities being touted 
as a profit making green project. How responsive the 
home state or the investing company is to initial chal-
lenges may also play a role as does the political leve-
rage and skills of the mobilizers and challengers.  
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